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politics. 
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The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s). 
European Parliament elections in May 2019 come at a critical time in the evolution of the EU 
as these will be the first elections after the expected departure of the UK (March 2019) and at 
a time when divergence on many issues characterises member state relations. Wider global 
developments weigh heavily on Europe with the return of hard geopolitics and efforts to 
undermine the global multilateral order. The European University Institute (EUI) wants to 
highlight the major issues that are at the heart of the political agenda at this juncture as a 
contribution to the debate. The papers are part of a wider programme on the elections 
including the development of a Voting Advice Application (VAA), euandi2019, and an 
online tool specifically tailored for mobile EU citizens voting either in their country of 
citizenship or residence, spaceu2019.
This initiative on the European Parliament elections in 2019 is part of the Schuman Centre’s 
European Governance and Politics Programme (EGPP) egpp.eui.eu. Launched in 2018, the 
Programme aims to foster high-quality academic research and reflection on the European 
Union and European integration with a medium to long-term perspective. The EGPP also 
promotes engagement on contemporary issues through various events, including blog 
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Abstract 
Carbon pricing is of crucial importance for decarbonisation and provides a solid economic framework 
for unifying the EU climate and energy policy strategy. The EU ETS is the main instrument for this 
purpose as it leads to a unique carbon price all over Europe. Given the difficulties it has encountered 
over the years, however, a set of additional ‘fragmented’ policies are also needed for decarbonisation. 
Among these, particular attention should be devoted to digitalisation as a promising tool that can 
radically innovate both the climate and the energy sectors in a more sustainable direction. 
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Introduction 
Nowadays, climate and energy issues are so strictly related that they can almost be regarded as two sides 
of the same coin. Energy production and consumption have a key influence on the ongoing global 
warming process. At the same time, climate change affects the whole energy system, requiring low-
carbon technologies that deeply modify the way energy is produced and transmitted. 
The climate and energy issue is particularly relevant for the EU for several reasons: (i) a high 
vulnerability of specific areas to climate change (e.g. the Mediterranean region); (ii) large and increasing 
migration flows towards Europe, which are often directly or indirectly related to environmental 
problems (so-called environmental refugees); and (iii) the European scarcity of natural resources and 
dependence on imports of energy sources from non-European countries, which increases European 
vulnerability to energy price fluctuations. 
These problems call for a rapid transition towards renewable energy sources that can reduce climate 
change and the other negative externalities provoked by the use of fossil fuels, and can lower the 
European dependency on imports of fossil fuels. Such a transition requires a coordinated intervention 
on both the climate and the energy sides. In this respect, carbon pricing plays a crucial role. Indeed, 
carbon pricing provides a solid economic framework for unifying EU climate and energy policy strategy 
and for paving the way towards a sustainable decarbonisation around 2050. However, additional policies 
are also needed to walk along this long ‘paved way’ towards the 2050 target. In what follows, we first 
investigate the features of and prospects for the European Emission Trading System (EU ETS), the main 
carbon-pricing tool adopted by Europe more than a decade ago, and then discuss the additional 
‘fragmented’ policies that will probably be needed to complement carbon pricing. A few concluding 
remarks will follow. 
The climate side of the coin: Carbon pricing and the prospects for the EU ETS 
In the last decade, the EU has largely relied on its Emission Trading System to achieve carbon pricing. 
The EU ETS covers more than 11,000 installations in various emission-intensive sectors which account 
for around 45% of overall European greenhouse gases (GHG). Introduced in 2005, the EU ETS was 
divided in phases of increasing length to give a longer time horizon and more certainty to investors. It 
is now in its third phase (2013-2020), but a new Directive reforming the EU ETS for Phase IV (2021–
2030) has recently been adopted (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2018) so 
that the following phase is already on the way. 
The EU ETS experienced several difficulties and a remarkable fall in the carbon price during the 
economic recession. This led the EU to pass a few reforms of the system to address the problems that 
emerged during the functioning of this mechanism. After more than a decade of application, it can be 
said that the EU ETS has gone through a continuous learning process. But this aspect, which could be 
interpreted as a drawback of the system, probably represents its strength. After years of low carbon 
prices in which the EU ETS was given up for dead by its critics, the price of the European allowances 
has risen remarkably (from below €5 per tonne of CO2 to around €20/tonne at the time of writing) after 
the announcement of the last reform. This confirms the crucial role expectations can play in anticipating 
a policy when it is perceived as sufficiently stringent, credible and long-term. The system obviously 
needs to be ‘handled with care,’ leaving the market free to adapt, but also with continual monitoring to 
ensure its proper functioning, and that is exactly what the EU is trying to do.  
For these reasons, despite its ups and downs, the EU ETS has become a prototype for other countries 
that are progressively setting up their own ETSs (Ellerman, 2010). Today there are 21 ETSs operating 
in the world, the share of global emissions covered by ETSs has tripled since 2005 reaching nearly 15% 
of total emissions, and the overall number of carbon pricing instruments has increased by 90% since 
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2012 (ICAP, 2018). This rapid ‘sprawling’ of carbon pricing is of primary importance in reducing the 
risk that unilateral policies may cause carbon leakage, inducing firms to delocalize their production to 
other areas of the world in which environmental policies are absent or less stringent. The diffusion of 
carbon pricing, however, is occurring in different ways in different countries. Some countries rely on 
carbon taxes, though the levels differ substantially across different regions (World Bank, 2017). These 
carbon pricing initiatives that are rapidly arising in developing countries can be interpreted as a transition 
phase, possibly leading to their own ETSs in the near future. For instance, the Pacific Alliance 
(encompassing Chile, Mexico, Colombia and Peru) is leading regional carbon pricing efforts in that part 
of the world. In particular, Mexico has already implemented a carbon tax and is planning to adopt a 
mandatory ETS after a three-year pilot phase to start in 2020, and is aiming to link it to the Western 
Climate Initiative in the years to come. In the near future, the same might apply to Chile and Colombia, 
which have introduced similar carbon taxes and are now considering the implementation of cap-and-
trade systems. 
The extension of carbon pricing to many areas of the world creates an opportunity for coordinating 
energy and climate policies across different countries with the aim of achieving a unique carbon price 
in the future. In this regard, the EU can and should play a leading role in the years to come, particularly 
now that climate does not seem to be an issue on the agenda of the Trump administration. The way 
forward is still very long and should be pursued with much caution to preserve the transparency and 
integrity of the EU ETS. However, linking the EU ETS with other countries’ carbon markets could be a 
policy option for the future if we are to achieve ambitious targets in terms of carbon abatement at 
minimum costs (Borghesi et al., 2016). After all, the EU ETS itself can be seen as an example of linking 
different national climate policies in the past. Therefore, the EU has the expertise to further extend the 
scope of the ETS mechanism and proceed along a similar path outside the EU. 
Nevertheless, more should also be done inside the EU. Almost half of the emissions are not covered 
by the EU ETS, including those produced by agriculture, buildings, waste and transport. The latter sector 
deserves particular attention because of the large health effects generated by increasing traffic volumes. 
The transport sector at the moment presents much room for efficiency improvement and emission 
reductions. But this requires support for clean cars and infrastructure, particularly if we want to change 
the mobility habits of the population. A vast economic literature, in fact, shows that car use is rather 
inelastic to increases in fuel prices and that people keep using their cars despite increasing traffic 
volumes. Easier and cheaper access to clean transport modes is therefore necessary to produce a shift in 
the population’s mobility paradigm. In this sense, digitalisation can provide a powerful tool by 
promoting, for instance, car sharing and bike sharing. However, as we will point out below, this is not 
the only sector in which digitalisation can make a difference for the decarbonization of our economic 
system. 
The energy side of the coin: fragmented EU policies  
As argued above, if policy-makers do not want to or cannot go fast or far along the way of carbon 
pricing, the general issue of carbon and energy has to be broken into various pieces. These need to be 
addressed separately and then re-combined as much as possible (given the large number of constraints 
created by fragmentation of the policies). In this regard, we can identify a set of ‘fragmented’ policies 
that should be prioritized in the years to come. 
1) The EU is to start its own Climate and Energy Targets ‘pledge and review’ exercise, as 
originated at COP 21. It is a ‘gathering & coordination’ of member states’ climate and energy national 
plans within a new frame that the EU calls ‘Energy Union Governance,’ which is a key part of the ‘Clean 
Energy for All’ package, already agreed via a successful ‘trilogue’ between the Council, Parliament and 
Commission. 
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2) The next big fragment is the EU renewables push, set at a 32% target in 2030 in another 
successful trilogue. It raises several questions and faces several challenges that will need to be addressed 
in the future: 1) how to commit at the EU level, when countries are free to define their national energy 
mix?; 2) how to open a European-wide investment and operation framework for RES deployment, 
irrespective of nationally ‘private’ policies?; 3) how to facilitate the creation of a handful of European 
‘international renewables majors’ (in off-shore wind or multi-RES) to become the mid-21st century 
equivalent to existing oil and gas majors and able to limit the pressure expected from Chinese 
‘international renewables majors’ like Three Gorges?; and 4) how to push our RES potential to a new 
high, knowing that (for example) our existing solar PV technologies have too low efficiency? How to 
prepare new solar PV technological waves departing from the currently existing technologies?  
3) A companion to this is getting both the distribution and transmission grids reorganised to host 
the maximum renewables capacity, to collect and route the maximum RES output, and to coordinate 
both their investment planning and their operation rules to make this RES push work in a secure and 
efficient manner at the EU level? 
4) The next is another push outside the traditional ‘electricity utility’ sector, as the greening of 
electricity via RES targets does not address the specific actions needed to decarbonize transport, heating 
and cooling, etc. In these sectors a serious effort has to be made to push ‘electrification’ as an easy and 
efficient way to decarbonize, in parallel with efforts to green electricity. The IEA is already gathering 
visions, ideas, and first practices. 
5) The next close fragment is with energy standards and energy efficiency. How to better promote 
decarbonisation via regulated standards and norms applied to vehicles, boats, planes and industrial, 
commercial and home devices and buildings? In addition, how to incentivize the users themselves to 
consume less and better? 
Two other very big fragments of energy policy will have to be carefully addressed by the new 
Commission. 
6) One is the whole gas area, which has been voluntarily left outside the current ‘Clean Energy 
Package”, a paradox given that the EU ‘Union for gas’ was a key driver for the Commission-Council-
Juncker-Tusk alliance for an ‘Energy Union’. The EU is still orphan of a unified external gas strategy, 
with some EU countries actively pushing their Russian partnership by building joint infrastructures 
crossing the external EU border, and others pushing a worldwide opening via LNG terminals. The EU 
is also orphan of an internal gas strategy, with some countries thinking gas beyond 2040 or 2050 and 
others starting to think where to set its phase-out. Other new fronts are open, with attempts at greening 
gas to make it a legitimate renewable. Other attempts are trying to closely tie gas use to the needs of a 
highly renewable generation of power, requiring the high level of operation flexibility that the gas 
system with its storage can offer (‘sector coupling’). 
7) The last fragment is on everyone’s mind but for different reasons and with different names. Let 
us call it ‘digitalisation’. This involves digitalising production, consumption, generators, networks, 
markets, exchanges, peer-to-peer trade, communities, homes, buildings, vehicles, neighbourhoods and 
cities up to a full ‘internet of things.’ A number of digital futures are already facing us in the energy 
sector: 1) a deep interactive digitalisation of energy markets and consumers’ premises feeding 
aggregation and demand response; 2) organization of the unchartered energy territory which lies ‘behind 
the meter’ and would become as interactive as a set of smartphones using internet 24/7 like the ‘internet 
of things’ is promising; 3) the opening of a new space of liberty and initiatives for the willing in ‘energy 
communities,’ up to the opening of ‘peer-to-peer’ platforms for trade, exchange and help with no 
commercial intermediary in between; 4) the building of clubs of sophisticated energy arrangements 
behind restricted entry, or the creation of ‘open resorts’ for automated artificial intelligence decision-
making, like self-driving cars, self-dealing buildings and voice-driven automated home assistants; and 
of course 5) a new generation of smart grids able to deliver most of these new services to the other 
players such as by hosting massive renewables, charging electrical vehicles, facilitating the aggregation 
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of consumers in demand response schemes, supporting smart buildings and reaching up to zero net 
consumption, etc. At their best in this new digital era, the grids should become open digital platforms 
supporting all the other initiatives in front of or behind the meter. 
Conclusions 
Carbon pricing plays an essential role if we want to decarbonize our economies in the next decades. The 
EU ETS provides a unifying tool for this purpose that harmonizes the member states’ climate and energy 
policies and stands out for its homogeneity in a ‘fragmented’ landscape. In the last few years (and 
especially during the recent recession) the EU ETS has been considered almost irrelevant by its critics 
due to its low allowance prices. While it has certainly gone through a learning process, it can have a key 
role in the years to come, as the currently rising allowance prices suggest. However, it might be 
insufficient on its own to internalize existing negative externalities. This is why we need a richer policy 
mix. Additional sectoral fragmented policies are therefore needed to complement the EU ETS in several 
different realms. 
All these many fragmented policies touch upon our coming future and the various promises relevant 
for sustainable human life in a sustainable environment and economy. We, in the EU, are coming closer 
and closer to identifying the most fundamental set of tools able to transform humans from climate foes 
into climate friends. The remaining difficulty will be how to combine them in a sensible and meaningful 
manner. 
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